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ing the hard cases and because they represent, after all, a controversial commitment: one way of looking at the world, but by no means
the only possible way.
Greenawalt undoubtedly shares the Enlightenment values. In
his restrained, judicious style, however, he shies away from saying
why, and be does not bring these values explicitly to bear on his
argument. His philosophical and legal close-order drill would be
more interesting, and perhaps more persuasive, if he unbent a little
and conveyed more fire about why free speech is important to him:
why it matters for the sort of civilization be obviously believes in.

INDIVIDUALS

AND

THEIR RIGHTS. By Tibor
Machan.1 LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co. 1989. Pp.
xviii, 250. $32.95, cloth; $16.95, paper.
Michael Zuckert 2
"The owl of Minerva," said Hegel, "flies only at dusk," by
which he meant that only after an historical order is well-established or even fading do the philosophers come to bring understanding of it. Whether Hegel's utterance bas such universal bearing as
be believed is a nice question, but regarding the issue of rights there
is much to be said for his assertion. We have had our "rights
revolution," and now we are getting philosophy's attempts to bring
some wisdom about rights. Since the mid-seventies or so many talented writers have philosophized about rights. To mention but a
few-Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, and Alan Gewirth have
presented sophisticated theories of rights, all purporting to make
sense of this concept so central to our political life, and each (of
course) presenting doctrines quite different from the others.
Tibor Machan is a frequent contributor to discussions about
rights in the journals, and he published an earlier book on the subject in 1975. He has now drawn together his more recent work into
another book. It could have been an important book, but its value
is much diminished by various failings. To begin, it is not welltailored. Machan has stitched the book together from previously
published essays: the seams show; annoying repetitions occur regularly, and it would have benefitted from a much more thorough
rewriting.
I.
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The book also has a genre problem. Although Machan seems
to aim at a general audience, he spends most of his time skirmishing
with fellow philosophy professors. In these skirmishes he tends to
deploy lighter artillery than seems appropriate for doing battle with
his fellow generals of rigorous thought. Moreover, his engagements
have something of the character of an old-fashioned cavalry
charge--a tremendous amount of smoke and dust, horses wheeling
every which way, a confusion of men running in all directionsafter a while it is difficult to tell who is on which side and how the
battle is going. This confusion stems, first, from the sheer number
of alternative philosophic ideas he is contesting-not just ideas
about rights, but about epistemology and the nature of science,
about universals and particulars, about the moral character (or lack
thereof) of egoism and the qualities of a good human life, about is
and about ought, and about whether ought really does imply can.
These battles usually occur without his clarifying sufficiently which
ridge the opposition holds, how much fire power they have and
what their fortifications are like. It is hard enough to ask lay readers to watch all the battles, but much worse not to explain what the
argument is about.
Machan's book, in other words, is certain to annoy, frustrate,
and lose many readers. This is unfortunate because he defends a
libertarian point of view which stands outside the bounds of the
liberal academic consensus. The standard response by the professoriate in such circumstances is to bury the offender by silence. To his
own detriment, Machan has laced his book with enough obvious
vices that those inclined to ignore it because of what it says will be
able to do so because of how it says it.
Nonetheless, Individuals and Their Rights is worth the effort it
requires, for Machan attempts to fill a slot in the on-going discussion of rights that needs filling. It would be more than tedious to
review all the rights theories that have popped up in the past twenty
years or so, but a schematic sketch can give an idea of some of the
main alternatives and of how Machan's effort relates to them. We
can identify four distinct types of rights theories. The differences
among them derive from different combinations of answers theorists
give to two questions within the broad realm of rights-thinking.
The first question is the simplest and most obvious: What rights are
there? The leading candidates are Lockean rights and welfare
rights. Lockean rights are the familiar rights to life, liberty, and
property, or in Thomas Jefferson's slightly revised formula, rights
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. All of these Lockean
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rights are "negative": they protect us from certain kinds of
interference.
The other kind of right is a positive right, or, as some put it, a
claim right. An example of each will help clarify the distinction. A
person has a positive right to the funds in his or her bank account;
this means that the bank, the duty-bearer in this case, has a duty to
supply the funds, the very thing to which the person has a right.
The right to freedom of speech is quite different. Here the dutybearers have no duty to supply the speaker with a speech, nor even
to listen to him. They merely must forbear from interfering with
valid exercises of the right.
A natural or human right can be given either a positive or a
negative interpretation. For example, the right to life may mean, as
a negative right, that all other persons are morally disbarred (under
ordinary circumstances) from taking life; as a positive right it imposes a claim on others for the means to life. This is why it makes
sense to call positive rights welfare rights, for they entail some sort
of claims on others or on society as a whole to the means of welfare
or well-being.
A right may even metamorphose from negative to positive.
During our recent rights revolution, we had a good example in the
right to counsel. It used to be a negative right; the state, the dutybearer here, was obliged merely to allow the right-holder (a defendant) to employ an attorney if he or she desired and was able. After
the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon, however, this right was
transformed into a positive right: the right-holder now has a right
to have counsel supplied by the state.
Among important rights theorists there have been champions
of both types of rights. Locke and Jefferson supported negative
rights; the best known of the recent theorists of negative rights
probably is Nozick. Advocates of positive rights include Gewirth,
the author of the most sophisticated of the recent theories, and
Ronald Dworkin. Although he did not cast his theory in this form,
John Rawls can also be seen as a positive rights theorist-at least
his theory of justice has been recently restated in that way by Rex
Martin. Another important and relatively well-known positive
rights theorist is the English legal philosopher, John Finnis.
The second question which divides the rights-theorists into different camps concerns the nature of the foundation or grounding of
rights. Here the answers roughly match those given in the field of
moral philosophy as a whole. Rights theories grounded in naturalism, in utilitarianism, or in a loose Kantianism have all appeared.
Each of these fundamental theories has a more or less distinguished
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representative in the current array of writers-Finnis, for example,
is a naturalist, David Lyons a utilitarian, and Gewirth a Kantian.
Although Lyons and other utilitarians have made a good effort, utilitarianism is not a promising ground for a rights theory-to some
degree the very impetus for the emergence of utilitarianism was the
rejection of natural rights, and the theory retains a fundamental inhospitality to them. So let us set utilitarian theories aside.
The two remaining kinds of foundations and the two types of
rights intersect to produce a four-fold typology of rights-theories:
one finds both naturalist positive and negative rights theories as well
as Kantian positive and negative rights theories. Thus Finnis is a
naturalist-positive, Gewirth a Kantian-positive, and Nozick a Kantian-negative. Machan's importance becomes visible at this point,
for he presents a serious version of a naturalist-negative rights theory, and thus completes the schema.
But it is not mere completeness that makes Machan's effort of
such interest. Within the American political and legal system there
is a special reason for interest in negative rights theories, for these
were the sorts of natural rights proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence and the inspiration for the drafters of the original
Constitution as well as the Reconstruction Amendments.
Another reason for welcoming Machan's effort is tied to the
internal dialectic of the recent discussions. The most promising approach to the question of rights seemed at first to be one or another
form of Kantianism. Rawls had set the tone with his theory of justice. Nozick retained Rawls's Kantian foundation-roughly the
moral principle that human beings must be treated as ends and not
merely as means-and showed that Rawls's own theory of justice,
and by implication, positive rights theories in general, could not satisfy that Kantian grounding. The claims contained in positive
rights, by imposing duties indiscriminately on others, in effect made
the others into means for the satisfaction of the rights-holders.
Nozick's critique of Rawls, and by implication of Kantian positive-rights theories, was more successful than his own effort to
build a negative rights theory on that same Kantian foundation.
Nozick's work failed resoundingly in three different areas: first, he
was unable to make good his own foundation; second, he was unable to generate a right to property (crucial for his theory) from his
foundation, and finally, his Kantian foundation proved too potent
to allow the development of a theory of legitimate political power.
He could not in fact escape the anarchy (state of nature, state of
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"no-rule") which was the moral beginning point for his theory.J
II

Machan explicitly takes Nozick's failure to establish a foundation as his point of departure. He wants to remedy Nozick's failure
by building on an altogether different kind of ground-a form of
naturalism he calls "classical egoism," which he says, "fills the gap
left by Nozick in the moral foundations." Machan's "classical egoism" is very different, however, from the more familiar egoism associated with the philosophy of Hobbes or Locke. He rejects
Hobbesian theory as too reductionist, too atomistic, too selfish and
over-committed to conflict as the natural human condition, too
closed to genuinely ethical human qualities like "loyalty, generosity,
good will, compassion," and at bottom, too subjectivist. Hobbesian
theory provides "a conception of individuality, selfhood or ego,
which is not anchored in any firm and stable (human) nature." In
place of (human) nature, Hobbesian egoism "depends wholly on individual (or collectively agreed to) wants, desires, or preferences."
Machan, therefore, does not mean merely to reassert an older
view of natural rights. The best known doctrines of natural rights,
those of Hobbes and Locke, were naturalist, egoist-negative, but
were not classical egoist. Like Nozick, Machan seeks to defend
Lockean rights, but on an un-Lockean foundation.
Unlike Nozick, he turns to Aristotle instead of Kant. Although "it has a classical pedigree," Machan's theory is nonetheless
"not in full accord with Aristotle's philosophy." Probably the most
obvious deviation from Aristotle is this: Aristotle was not a philosopher of natural rights, and surely not of negative natural rights.
He defended not a libertarian minimal state, but a robust notion of
the comprehensive moral purpose of politics. In other words, Aristotle was not even a liberal, much less a libertarian like Machan.
To Machan, Aristotle stands for the general principle of "metaphysical naturalism": things, human beings included, possess natures which are graspable by the human intellect. Machan also
understands moral matters more or less in the manner of Aristotle:
life itself sets criteria for successful living or "flourishing." By nature, humans strive for this condition of flourishing, called happiness by both Aristotle and Machan. This idea supplies "the core of
the concept of good: being in a position to complete the nature of
what something is makes that something a good one of its kind.
The human good, at its most complete, would be the most fully,
3.
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consistently realized manifestation of human nature." The emphasis on flourishing or happiness means Machan takes roughly the
same naturalistic tack as several other recent legal philosophersfor instance, Finnis and Michael Perry.
He differs from them (and from Aristotle) in that his naturalism is clearly egoistic. "The classical egoist holds that the primary
ethical task for each person is the fullest development of himself or
herself as a living human being and as the individual that he or she
is." Human good has a unique character compared to other kinds
of natural goods. Human beings are like all beings in that the same
general principle of excellence holds: "We would have an excellent
human being if we found one who most fully and consistently realized human nature." But "human nature" needs to be specified:
"Every human being is a rational animal." To be rational means,
preeminently, to be "capable of self-motivation or initiation of its
own functions," i.e., to be a "self-responsible" being which is for
that reason an ethical egoist. The "specifically human good,"
which is "ethics or morality," is "that aspect of human good subject
to determination by the person, or open to choice." The human
good, morality, thus differs from purely naturalistic goods of other
beings in that it requires the exercise of the rational faculty or the
exercise of choice. As Machan summarizes his point, "to be morally meritorious, the right course of conduct must be chosen." The
individual, therefore, is an egoist not for the amoral Hobbesian reason that he or she is a passion-driven, self-seeking hedonist, but for
a fully moral reason: the obligation to live in a fully ethical or responsible way the only "particular human life over which [a] person
has direct responsibility, namely, oneself." And so, Machan concludes, "ethical egoism . . . is not an ethics of greed, position, or
power, but one of self-development."
He thinks it but a short step from ethical egoism as the standard of moral good to natural rights as the standard of political
good. Egoism implies that "each of us should choose to attain our
happiness and among others this can be realized only if each has a
sphere of sovereignty, his or her moral space in society." This
"sphere of sovereignty" or "moral space" is precisely what rights
delimit. "Rights specify the sole personal authority of someone to
judge and the jurisdiction to act." Machan's egoism posits as the
primary dimension of morality the claim of moral autonomy for the
self; but, he insists, the self is required also to recognize the rights of
others. "If one chooses to be part of human community life, one is
implicitly consenting to the necessary conditions for such association, namely, respect for other people's sovereignty over their own
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lives and the reasonable securing of those conditions, that is to say,
enforceable basic rights." Recognition of the rights of others is a
rationally discernible condition for social life, and all "moral agents
... have implicitly agreed to be so bound." But what they are
bound to is recognition of the sphere of autonomy of others, i.e.,
recognition of purely negative rights.
Such is Machan's argument grounding natural rights. What is
of interest in it compared to that of his fellow negative rights theorist, Nozick, is not only the greater richness of detail in Machan,
but the way in which he extracts a wholly negative conception of
rights from a positive moral argument. What is of interest in
Machan's arguments compared to that of fellow ethical naturalists
like Finnis and Perry is the way he brings out an often hidden egoist
bias in the ethics of "flourishing." Machan brings out, as Perry
never does, the problematic character of deriving positive moral obligations (or positive rights) from ethical naturalism.
Machan's second main task, after attempting to ground rights
in general, is to derive a specific right to property. This right is at
once central to his libertarian project and problematical beyond the
other rights. It is central to his project because much of the governmental intrusion into the lives of individuals to which he objects
involves alleged violations of property rights. It is problematical
because, unlike rights to life and liberty which more clearly involve
claims for sovereignty or control by the individual over what is his
or her own life, body and actions, the right to property involves
exclusive claims to the external world. How such claims over what
is not one's own can arise is a question which has long tried the
ingenuity of philosophers.
Machan rejects the Lockean answer that one makes some part
of the external world one's own by mixing with it something that is
clearly one's own, one's labor. He also rejects the typical pragmatic
or utilitarian answer of the economists that private property increases productivity, because, while that may be true, it does not
establish a moral right to property. Instead, "the right to private
property is a moral prerequisite for the realization of the task of
self-development within a social context," because "borders between individuals are needed to make self-governance possible."
Property is the individual's "determinate sphere of authority"
which is the necessary environment in which "the moral life of individuals can flourish." Property, as Machan conceives it, is rights
made flesh. Since moral life is a life of individual choice, "collective
planning is not only inefficient, . . . but morally reprehensible."
Like Nozick, Machan has such a strong theory of rights that
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he is driven to take seriously the question posed by moral anarchism: "whether it is possible to acquire and possess legitimate political authority at all." He parts company from many of his fellow
libertarians in holding that "political authority, once it is properly
understood, is justified within an individualist moral framework."
Although not exactly following the classical natural rights thinkers,
he is much closer to them on this issue than on the others. The
beginning point is the right to self-defense, the right to use force to
protect oneself and one's rights. Via consent, this rightful power
can be transferred to agents specially constituted to exercise it.
While this process legitimates government, it legitimates only a
strictly limited or minimal state, one limited to securing rights.
That must be so, for individuals have no other rightful power over
others than to protect themselves and their rights, and therefore
they can never authorize governments to do more.

III
Such, in outline, is the argument of Machan's book. Does his
naturalist classical egoism deliver a more successful theory of rights
than Nozick's Kantianism? Of the three chief issues-the grounding of rights in general, the derivation of a right to property, and the
legitimation of political authority-the chief interest of Machan's
argument lies in the first two, for his treatment of the third is fairly
ordinary and, unlike Nozick's, not in obvious contradiction with
the foundations of his own argument.
Machan's argument on the right to property cannot be judged
successful, at least not for generating a right of the sort he claims.
The problem is simple. If the ground for a right to property is the
contribution property makes to the moral task of "self-governance"
through providing "borders between individuals" and a "sphere of
authority" for each, then what appears to follow is some modicum
of property for each and every rights-holder, that is, for all human
beings. Machan's argument bears up well, or well enough, against
the challenge of collectivism, but it does not rebut, indeed it is an
argument for, redistribution of private property. A Machan libertarian might sponsor land-reform, for example, and steep inheritance
taxes. Machan's argument, in other words, comes closer to establishing a positive right to property than the negative right he believes he has established.
If Machan replies that moral self-determination means that
one lives with the consequences of one's actions, including gaining
or losing property, the problem still remains of those who are born
into the world with natural rights, but no property. They do not
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lack this essential feature of their existence as rights-holders because
of the choices they have made, but because they never had property
to lose. At the very least, then, Machan's argument would establish
a right to a "stake" for all. To put the point more broadly, Machan
needs to consider how the limitation on property acquisition that
Locke described-that enough and as good be left for others-bears
on his own theory. Locke dealt with that problem through an argument about the productive power of labor and the need for private
property to unleash labor; Machan has closed off this line of argument and pursues no other.
The failure of Machan's negative property right deals a fatal
blow to his theory as part of his libertarian political project, but the
most interesting theoretical question nevertheless remains: can he
generate a theory of negative natural rights from his foundation in
"Aristotelian" egoism?
At one point Machan supplies a formula that provides a good
place to begin the consideration of this most important question:
"to be morally meritorious, the right course of action must be chosen." As should be clear from the previous discussion, this statement is not a mere truism. Rather he is setting out a double
criterion that must be met for moral merit to inhere in an action: it
must be the "right course of conduct," and it must be "chosen."
The right action externally imposed lacks moral merit; the wrong
course freely chosen also lacks merit. A failure to satisfy either of
these two requirements produces a moral failure, but Machan treats
them in an interestingly non-parallel manner. One of the conditions
imposes an absolute moral demand on all action, while the other
imposes hardly any demand. The requirement of free choice must
be satisfied under all conditions, whether the exercise of choice
leads to the right course of conduct or not. Never does the "right
course of conduct" impose on the role of choice. But if they are
both equally necessary conditions for a morally correct action, and
jointly the necessary and sufficient condition for such, then it does
not follow that the "choice" requisite should be privileged in the
way it is by Machan.
The difference between Aristotle and Machan derives from just
this privileging of choice by the latter. For Aristotle, the question
of ethics is substantially more complex, for he refuses to ignore the
substantive issue of the right course of conduct. Indeed, politics
fulfills for Aristotle the crucial moral role of helping to educate the
citizenry toward "the right course of conduct," for, while that
course is presumably the natural end or leads to the flourishing of
the individual, there are nonetheless many natural barriers to it.
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Virtue is relatively rare and must be worked at. Aristotle, therefore,
almost reverses Machan's priorities: training towards virtue stands
as the most legitimate task of the polity. The well-trained person
then chooses the right course of conduct. Aristotle would consider
it foolish or worse to elevate choice over virtuous conduct. For Aristotle, the moral-political problem requires a complex adjustment
of habituation and choice, such that no formulation in terms of negative rights can begin to do justice to it.
Machan not only misses the way Aristotelian politics serves a
moral function by contributing centrally to the production of virtue
(habitually right course of conduct), but also the way in which it is
the sphere in which choice is exercised. In political participation, in
the process of ruling and being ruled, and in sharing in deliberation
regarding the just and the unjust, the beneficial and the harmful,
human beings are not only seeking the right course of conduct and
setting out on paths toward it, but also doing so in a human, rational and free way. Machan continually denies that his system
makes extreme assumptions about human asociality like those of
Hobbes, but his differences from Aristotle bring out just how individualistic he remains. In sum: Aristotle cannot be drafted for service as a natural rights theorist, nor does Machan's version of
naturalism seem superior to his.
That in itself, of course, does not settle any issue except
whether Machan can succeed at his project of a natural rights theory on an Aristotelian naturalist foundation. On closer examination, it seems to me, Machan has not developed a naturalistic ethic
at all. At bottom his is a theory of agency, very like, but less selfaware than that of Gewirth, who argued that rights are the necessarily recognized conditions for human agency. For Machan, rights
derive exclusively from the choice dimension and thus too are requisites for effectuating human agency. In Gewirth, this line of reasoning produces a theory of positive rights, and it is not evident that
Machan's argument for negative rights is a more valid inference
from the premises.
Machan has not established his most interesting claim-that a
moral foundation of a roughly Aristotelian type can produce a theory of negative rights. He fails here because he lets go of Aristotelian naturalism to a far greater extent than he acknowledges. On
the other hand, he also does not establish his negative rights as the
result of a theory of agency. Nor does he establish the approach via
agency as superior to the naturalism he explicitly defends.
For all that, Machan's is a respectable, indeed an admirable
effort, even if at bottom it is no more successful than Nozick's.
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Does his failure imply that negative rights theories, i.e., theories of
the sorts of rights affirmed in the American founding, are simply
untenable? Some would say so. I would say instead that the current efforts at establishing negative rights have one very odd feature.
There is a strenuous effort to defend Lockean rights, but just as
strenuous an effort to avoid Lockean grounds for doing so. We
have had Nozick's Kantian theory and now Machan's half-Aristotelian argument, but not a Lockean theory. There are difficulties
with Locke's own version of rights theory, I admit, but there was a
tradition, much of it in America, which worked at Lockean rights
in a Lockean way. I will close with the suggestion that what we
need from our rights theorists now is a strenuous effort to think
Lockean rights through in a Lockean manner.
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For most readers of this journal, the first question about The
Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism is probably, "What
on earth is 'The New Institutionalism'?" This is a simple question,
which unfortunately has no equally simple answer. The "New Institutionalism" is one of several names for a new school of scholarship about government, which is also known as "rational choice,"
"social choice," or-most commonly-"public choice." Both the
proper name for the school and the exact boundaries of its subject
matter are still hotly contested, and already sub-schools have arisen.
This is a field very much in flux, and therefore difficult to define.
Still, at least a tentative definition is necessary in order to proceed. One of the editors of the book defines the field as including
"analyses using tools derived from microeconomics, game theory,
and social choice to the effect of decision-making rules and institutional structure on outcomes." More simply, James Buchanan
(who won the Nobel prize in economics for his work in the area)
defines public choice as "the application of the theoretical method
and techniques of modem economics to the study of political
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